SOVEREIGNTY AND WATER RESOURCES
Harrison C. Dunning
Professor of Law
University of California at Davis

Within the American polit ical sys tem, should the courts
prohibit a legislature or a popular majority from
dissolving the state, the ultimate privatization of
previously public functions? Less dramatically, what
should happen if a legislature at a given moment in time
in some manner seeks to abolish its police power to act to
protect public health, safety, welfare and morals? Or
purports to suspend its power to tax forever, or perh aps for
a fixed period of tim e?
These questions are perplexing, for they bring into conflict
the democratic ideal of self-government and the notion of
some irreducible minimum of power inher ent in t he state.
On the one hand, it is commonly thought in a democracy
the majority should prevail, subject of course to
constitutional requirements. Thus, although we have a
Bill of Right s to ensure fundament al right s, those
constitutional provisions are themselves subject to repeal
in accordance with a constitutional ly specified process.
On th e other han d, ma ny would a ccept that regardless of
constitutions a majority could go "too far" in purporting to
reduce the power of the state and thus the ability of the
people in the future to express its will through public
means.

in the Commonwealth and cannot be gran ted." (Home,
1798).
Nineteenth century disputes over access to oyster beds
beneath navigable waters in New Jersey led to some
noteworthy judicial decisions on sovereignty and property
rights. In 1821 a state court decision stated that navigable
bays and rivers "are common to all the citizens" and that
title to their beds is vested in the sovereign for their
benefit. (Arn old, 1821). This suggests not only that the
beds are inalienable to private parties — or, at a
minimum, that any permitted ali enation is subject t o a
special protective legal regime — but also that for all
purposes the sovereign holds title as a fiduciary. Hence,
the thoug ht emerges that the beds of na vigable bodies of
water, like the navigable waters themselves, are subject to
a "public trust," an idea which has blossomed in the
twentieth century.

Martin v. Waddell, a U.S. Supreme Court decision in
1842, recognized the link between sovereignty and
property rights, saying that the state court decision of
1821 was "unquestionably entitled to great weight."
(Martin, 1842). Martin dealt with a tangl ed web of grants
of large par ts of New Jersey by the English King, but its
To understand the bearing of th ese general questi ons on essence is found in the statement that pri vate dom ination
water resources, one m ust explore th e way in which in of the beds of navigable waters is unaccepta ble. As Chief
American legal thought sovereignty has sometimes been Justice Roger Taney declared:
linked with public proper ty rights a nd how that lin kage on
occasion has led courts to strike down legislative efforts to
the men who first formed the En glish
surren der the public property rights in question. Our legal
settlements, could not have been expected to
history in this regard has centered on navigable waters,
encounter the many hardships that unavoidably
which two hundred years ago in a time of no air
attended their em igration to the n ew world, and
transpor tati on and limited sur face land tr ansp ortation
to people the banks of its bays and rivers, if the
were of central impor tance to the com munity. Although
land under th e water at their very doors was
the community interest was in access for commercial
liable to imm ediat e appr opria tion by another as
purposes to the navigable waters, judicial at tention tended
private property; and th e settler upon the fast
to be directed to the ownership of the land beneath the
land thereby excluded from its enjoyment, and
navigable waters. Often those beds of navigable waters
unable to take a shellfish from its bottom, or
were assumed to be inherently public — simply not
fasten a stake, or even bathe in i ts waters,
subject to alien ation into priva te owner ship regardless of
without becoming a trespasser upon the rights
what the majority or, perh aps, even all the people might
of another.
wish. Thus in 1798 the highest court in Virgin ia declar ed
flatly that the ownership of a bed of a navigable river "is
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EQUAL FOOTING
Although our ear liest judicial pronouncements about the
special status of navigable waters and their bedlands came
in regard to disputes arising in the thir teen states wh ich
had formed the Union, the Supreme Court was quick to
extend the same thinking to other states. (Pollard's
Lessee, 1845). The vehicle for this extension was the
"equal footing" doctrine — largely a political idea, but one
which developed a proprietary aspect. As a political idea,
equal footing assures that we do not have first-class and
second-class states within the American nation — later
admitt ed states have the same status as the original
thirteen states. This idea is explicitly expressed in the acts
admitting most of the states (Hanna, 1951), and the
Supreme Court has indicated in any event it is rooted in
the U.S. Constitution (Oregon ex rel. State Land Board,
1977).
As a proprietary idea, equal footing mean s tha t upon
admi ssion to the Union, each state by operation of law
acquires title to the beds of all navigable waters within its
boundaries. Very lim ited ex ception s are recogn ized for
prest atehood gran ts by prior sovereigns of an area —
Mexico, for example, in the case of the Southwest and
California — or by the federal government during the
territorial period, but for th e vast majority of the beds of
navigable waters the state upon admission acquires
ownership as a function of state sovereignty. This process
is in stark contrast to the extended bargaining and explicit
grants which occurred for other types of federal land
turned over to the states. (Gates, 1968). And, as the
English idea that "navigable" waters were those where the
tide ebbs and flows was replaced by the American concept
that in addi tion na vigable waters exi st where rivers and
lakes in the interi or of the country are susceptible to use
for commercial purposes, the amount of land recogn ized
as held in a sta te sovereign capacity has increased
considerably. (Dunning, 1996)

(U.C. Davis La w Review, 1980; Envir onmen tal La w,
1989). One judicial decision, now over one hundred years
old, has ha d enormous influence on both courts and
commentators in their analysis of the public trust doctrine,
particularly in the past thirty years. (Dunning, 1996).
That is Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, a
U.S. Supreme Court decision which dealt with an
uncompensated legislative revocation of a grant of over a
thousand acres of Chicago's outer har bor to a railroad.
The Court there rebuffed the railroad's challenge to the
revocation, and in doing so it emphasized both the
sovereign basis of the public trust doctrine and the
consequence of the fiduciary obligation which grows out
of the sovereign status. It said, for example, that the beds
of navigable waters such as Lake Michigan are held "by
the people in trust for their com mon use and of common
right as an incident of their sovereignty" (emphasis
added), attributing sovereignty to the people themselves,
and that as a consequence disposition of those bed s cann ot
be subject to an "irrepealable" contract. (Illinois Central,
1892). Illinois was free to revoke its ill-advised grant —
one an historian has suggested was tain ted by corr uption
(Myers, 1968) — with out compensatin g the railroad for
any increase i n the value of the property. (The City of
Chicago, designated in the original bill as the gran tee of
the harbor lands and in the final legislation as the
recipient of the purchase price of $800,000, had refused to
accept any payment.)

Illinois Central has been followed by courts in over three
dozen states, often in disputes over the alienation of the
beds of navigable waters to private persons or entities. A
dramatic recent exam ple of th e power of the public trust
doctrine involved another grant of part of the bed of Lake
Michigan in Chi cago, this time a mer e 18.5 acre parcel
conveyed by the Illinois legislature for the expan sion of a
private university campus. Despite various indications in
the legislation of how the expansion would be in the
public interest, a feder al distri ct court in reliance on
Illinois Central and subsequent state court decisions
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
permanently enjoined the university from placing fill
material on the parcel. (Lake Michigan Federation,
State title to the beds of navigable waters is an important 1990).
matter, but the fiduciary manner in which that title is held
is of even greater significance. For the beds, as for other Most public trust doctrin e cases in this century have dealt
sovereign resources, the state has a duty "to protect the with the beds of navigable waters, and most have sought
people's common heritage" (National Audubon Society, to accommodate t he public right to access to navi gable
1983). Exercise of this duty can have important waters for navigation, fishing and other purposes with the
consequences for private rights in land and other natural constant pressure to fill and develop these areas for
resources, including water. Most legal analysis of this business use, housing, airports and other uses. Until the
duty occurs under the rubric of the "public trust doctrine." modern environ ment al movement of the last thi rty years,
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trust doctrine in California typically had involved a
conflict between sovereign pr erogatives and private rights
in land. (Dunnin g, 1980). From a public use perspective,
however, the con cern had usual ly been access to the
navigable waters above some parcel of land, for example
land a private grantee might seek to fill for development.
Although no public trust doctrine case had in volved water
rights, it had always been obvious that th e exerci se of
water rights could have the same sort of detrimental
effects as the exercise of land rights. To dry up a lake
One consequence of the modern environ ment al pr otection over time by diverting all the inflow is functionally
movement for the public trust doctrine has been a comparable to drying it up by draining and filling it.
broadening of the purposes stated for the protective
fiduciary dut y. To the hist oric trilogy of use for In its 1983 Mono Lake decision , the Supreme Cour t of
navigation, commerce and fishing — with "commerce" California noted the tension between the public rights of
clearly involving that linked to navigation, such as access to and preservation of navigable waters — Mono
business on wharves — courts in some jurisdictions h ave Lake had been found to be such in an earlier decision
added preservation. In California, for example, in a (City of Los Angeles, 1935) — and the ri ghts of water
dispute over tidelands i n Tomales Bay, the state supreme appropriators to divert water and put i t to reasonabl e
court noted that the public uses of tidelands "are beneficial use. It said the public trust doctrine and the
sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs" prior appr opria tion water right system were in some sense
and said there is "growing public recognition that one of on a "collision course," but it refused to subordinate one to
Instead, it ruled, there must be an
the most important public uses . . . is the preser vation of the other.
accommodation:
the exercise of appropriative water rights
those lands in their natural state, so th at they may serve as
is
to
be
limited
whenever
feasible in order to pr otect public
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as
trust
values.
environments which provide food and habitat for birds
and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery
and climate of the area." (Marks, 1971). Statemen ts such Precisely what the Mon o Lake rulin g in 1 983 meant for
as these subtly move the public trust doctrine fr om a right diversions of water by the City of Los Angeles in the
of access to navigable waters in whatever condi tion th ey Mono Basin took many years to work out. After a number
are found to one that requires t hat some qua ntitati ve of different judicial proceedings, however, a state agency
and/or qualita tive standard be maintain ed. In oth er decided upon an accommodation which severely restricts
words, the "na tural state" of tidelands can exist only if the diversion. (Koehler, 1995). Very little diver sion will be
permitt ed unti l the lake r ecovers to a specified level;
water is th ere.
thereafter, the city's diversions will be less than half the
volume of water routinely diverted prior to the litigation.
THE MONO LAKE LITIGATION

generally the accommodation favored development —
witness the fa ct that over forty percent of San Fr ancisco
Bay, the West Coast's lar gest estuar y, was filled by 1966.
(San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development
Commission, 1966). Within the past thi rty years,
however, development in areas of navigable water has
slowed consid erably, often because of coastal zone or
shoreline management and regulatoryschemes of one kind
or another.

The Mono La ke lit igat ion pr omises pr ofound
consequences for Cal ifornia water rights law, as longestablished diversions and impoundments approved in an
earlier time are reevaluated. The eth ic of the past that
fresh water reaching the sea in California (or a saline sink
such as Mono Lake) is "wasted" — an ethic which
supported a constitutional amendment in California — is
being replaced by an accommodation that is far more
sensitive to environmental concerns. (Dunning, 1993).
This realignment is being driven par tly by the public trust
doctrine and part ly by some statutor y fish pr otection
measures which are often regarded as a partial
codifica tion of the public trust doctrine, but water quality
Until the Mono Lake litigation, cases involving the public and endangered species legislation are playing an

For sovereignty and water r ights, a decision of major
significan ce was handed down in 1983 in litigation in
California over diversions by the City of Los Angel es from
fresh water tri butaries of th e highl y saline Mono Lake.
(National Audubon Soci ety, 1983). Increasing diversions
by the city since 1940 had caused a dramatic decline in the
lake's level, creatin g serious concerns both over the impa ct
on wildlife and, given fierce dust storms dominated by
alkaline mater ial fr om the newly exposed lakeshor e,
human health . Those cha llenging the diversions ad vanced
several legal th eories, but th eir success came from
invocation of the public trust doctrin e.
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important role as well.
IDAHO'S STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
These developments in Californ ia water law have not been
greeted with enthusia sm in all quarters. The most hostile
reaction has been in Idaho, a state curr ently dominated
politically by agricultural, tim ber and mining interests
threatened by the prospect of a nat ural r esources
realignment giving greater weight to environmental
protection. Recent legislation in Idaho purports to
preclude most applica tions of the public trust doctrine,
raising squarely the question whether public righ ts rooted
in sovereignty can be so drastically reduced. Just as one
can ask whether a legislature may be perm itted to dissolve
the state, one can question whether it may disavow long
standing public rights to the enjoyment of navigable
waters.
The public trust doctrine has never been used in Idaho to
restrict the exercise of a water right, but shortly after the
Mono Lake decision in California in 1983 the Idaho
Supreme Court in a case about a yacht club lease
undert ook a thorough review of the public tr ust doctrin e.
In its compreh ensive discussion, the court stated its
approval of the Mon o Lake decision and commented that
"the public trust doctrine takes precedence even over
vested water rights." (Kootenai Environ mental Allian ce,
1983). This point was reaffirmed a few years later in a
decision on the massive Snake River Basin Adjudication,
although in the context of that adjudication environmental
groups were denied permission to intervene in order to
raise public trust concerns. (Idaho Con servation Lea gue,
Inc., 1995). Timber interests joined farmers in their alarm
over the public trust doctrine when that same year the
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that an environmental group
could make a public trust claim where it alleged a timber
sale on state endowment lands would produce erosion
damaging to a navigable water way. (Selkirk-Priest Basin
Association, 1995).
Agricultural and timber interests in Idaho prevailed upon
the legislature in 1996 to enact a radical measure on the
public trust doctrine. An act commonly known as House
Bill 794 states, for example, that i n Idaho th e public trust
doctrine "shall not apply" to the appropriati on or use of
water or to the granting, tr ansfer, admin istr ation or
adjudication of water rights. (Idaho Code, 1996).

modified or eliminated at will by the legislature.
Legislative findings asserted that the public trust doctrine
creates "confusion" in the management of state waters and
endowment lands and that oth er laws sufficient ly protect
the public interest in those resources. (Idaho Code, 1996).
Although House Bill 794 is vulnerable to attack on both
federal and Idaho constit utional groun ds, (Blumm et al.,
in press) it is the give-away of public rights rooted in
sovereignty which is th e most offensive feature of the
statute. The er ror of the Ida ho legislature is to treat the
public trust doctr ine as merely a conventional common
law rule. In fact, in American legal thought — as in the
legal thought of societies as far back as the Eastern Roman
Empire (Stevens, 1980) — sovereign rights are
fundamental ones not subject to comprehensive
repudiation by the legislature. As one court noted, "[t]he
very purpose of the public trust doctrin e is to police the
legislature's disposition of public lands." (Lake Michigan
Federation, 1990). As th e Mono Lake litigation
demonstrates, through th e public trust doctrine the courts
also when appropriate provide for constraining the
legislativelyauthorized award of water rights which, when
exercised, impact navigable waters. They act when the
legislature abdicates the state's role as trustee to the
advantage of private par ties.
Idaho is not the only state where courts have had to deal
with legislative abdication of sovereign rights in recent
years. In 1987, the Arizona legislature purported to
"quitclaim" any state title "based on navigability" to many
bedlands throughout th e state. (Arizona Session Laws,
1987). Four year s later, the Ar izona Court of Appeals
invalid ated the statute. (Arizona Center for Law in the
Public Interest, 1991). In a judicial opinion which
combined an analysis of the public trust doctrine with
consid eration of the gi ft clause of the Arizona
constitution, which prohibits public entities in Arizona
from making "a ny dona tion or grant, by subsidy or
otherwise, to any individual, association, or corporation"
(Arizona Constitution, 1910), the court found by failing to
allow for a particularized assessment of the public rights
being surrendered the legislature was derelict regarding
"the state's special obligation to maintain the trust for the
use and enjoyment of present and future generations."
(Arizona Center for La w in the Publi c Interest, 1991).
The Arizona legislature responded by setting up a
navigable stream adjudication commission to engage in
the particularized assessment referenced by the Court of
Appeals. (Arizona Session Laws, 1992).

Proponents of this legislati on justifi ed it on the theory the
public trust doctrine is a creature of the "common law,"
i.e. judge-made law, and that therefore the doctrine can be At the time of writin g of thi s paper , to the author's
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knowledge no litigation has been filed to challenge Idaho's
House Bill 794. Sh ould such litigation develop, the courts
will be called upon to review its validity. Any court
hesitates before striking down a majoritar ian mea sure,
particularly where there is no express constitutional
provision upon which to rely. But in the case of sovereign
rights, ones which historically involve the public's
enjoyment of our heritage of navigable waters, courts on
a number of occasions have found th at legisla tures have
gone too far in their privatization efforts. In Illinois
Central, the Illinois legislature it self realized its mistake
and revoked its grant of Chicago's outer harbor to the
railroad. But in later Ill inois cases, as in the Arizona
situation, there was no legislative revocation. Yet courts
in those instances acted to protect public sovereign rights
— to enforce the sta te's duty "to protect the people's
common heri tage of streams, lakes, marshlands and
tidelands." (National Audubon Society, 1983). The Idaho
courts should do no less.
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